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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by Appellant, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, (hereafter referred to as 
"Mrs. Ashton"), from the Judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Civil No. 89-3900184 & 89-0904564, entered on the 11th day of July, 
1994. The appeal was originally filed with the Supreme Court for the State of Utah 
pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2(3)0) (1953), as amended. On November 14th, 
1994, the appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. Jurisdiction 
is proper in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2a-3(k), (1953), as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
All issues identified by Mrs. Ashton are issues of law. She is not contesting the 
findings of fact made by the trial court or the sufficiency of the evidence. Brief of 
Appellant, p.2. 
When findings of fact are not challenged, or a transcript of the trial is not 
provided, the appellate court takes judicial notice of the of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law reached by the trial court. Low v. Bonnacci. 788 P.2d 512, 512 
(Utah 1990). However, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. McMahan v. Dees, 873 P.2d 1172, 
1175 (Utah App. 1994). 
With respect to the issue of whether the trial court erroneously placed the 
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burden of proof on Mrs. Ashton, the appropriate standard of review provides that, 
notwithstanding the application of burden of proof upon the wrong party, the appellate 
court looks to the evidence to determine whether respondents, (hereafter referred to as 
"the Ashton children") met the burden of proof that should have been theirs and, if so, 
the lower court decision is affirmed.1 Pilcherv. Pilcher, 197 P.2d 143, 147 (Utah 1948); 
City Electric v. Industrial Indemnity Corp., 683 P.2d 1053, 1059-1060 (Utah 1984). 
With respect to the issue or whether the findings of fact are sufficient to support 
the trial court's judgment, the appropriate standard of review provides that the appellate 
court review the findings as to whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and 
pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for the judgment. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 
270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
Appellant identifies only two issues in her statement of issues; 1) whether the 
lower court erred, as a matter of law, by determining that Mr. Ashton's estate includes 
property that was clearly titled and held by Mr. and Mrs. Ashton as a joint tenant with 
full rights of survivorship; and, 2) whether the lower court erred, as a matter of law, in 
denying Mrs. Ashton's claim for expenses incurred in the administration of Mr. Ashton's 
estate while Mrs. Ashton was acting in her capacity as decedent's personal 
representative. Brief of Appellant, pp. 1-2. 
With respect to the first issue, Mrs. Ashton added several additional collateral 
issues, or sub-issues, in her argument which consist of the following: 1) whether the 
trial court erred by considering whether or not she contributed to any part of the 
purchase price of the joint tenancy property, ]d. at pp. 9-10; 2) whether the trial court 
erred by erroneously placing the burden of proof on Mrs. Ashton instead of placing the 
burden of proof on the Ashton children, jd. at pp. 14-16; 3) whether the trial court erred 
by failing to ascertain the decedent's intent at the time he caused title to be taken in 
joint tenancy, jd. at pp. 16-18; and, 4) whether the findings of fact are sufficient to 
support the trial court's judgment that the Ashton children proved clearly and 
convincingly that the decedent did not intend to create valid joint tenancies with Mrs. 
Ashton, id. at pp. 18-20. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative or are of central importance to the 
issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Anno. § 75-3-104(1) - (2) (1953), as amended: 
(1) Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to joint account 
belong to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the 
decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different 
intention at the time the account is created. If there are two or more 
surviving parties their respective ownerships during lifetime shall be in 
proportion to their previous ownership interests under Section 75-6-103 
augmented by an equal share for each survivor of an interest the 
decedent may have owned in the account immediate before his death; 
and the right of survivorship continues between the surviving parties. 
(2) If the account is a P.O.D. account: 
(a) On death of one of two or more original payees the rights to any 
sums remaining on deposit are governed by Subsection (1); 
(b) On death of the sole original payee or of the survivor of two or 
more original payees, any sums remaining on deposit belong to the 
P.O.D. payee or payees if surviving, or to the survivor of them if one or 
more die before the original payee; if two or more P.O.D. payees survive, 
there is no right of survivorship in event of death of a P.O.D. payee 
thereafter unless the terms of the account or deposit agreement expressly 
provide for survivorship between them. 
Utah Code Anno. § 75-3-703(1) (1953), as amended: 
A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard of 
care applicable to trustees as described by Section 75-7-302. A personal 
representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the 
decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will 
and this code and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the 
best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him 
by this code, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to 
which he is party for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
Utah Code Anno. § 75-3-719 (1953), as amended: 
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If any personal representative or person nominated as personal 
representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, 
whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his 
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal filed by Mrs. Ashton from the judgment of the Honorable Judge 
Leslie A. Lewis in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
pertinent provisions of the judgment hold as follows: 
1. That the decedent's (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Ashton") and Mrs. Ashton's 
March 12th, 1986 wills are not joint and reciprocal wills; 
2. That under Mr. Ashton's will, he devised 91 % of his entire estate to his 
surviving children to be divided between them equally per capita, and devised the 
remaining 9% to Mrs. Ashton's children to be divided between them equally per capita, 
subject to his devise of a simple life estate, without any power of consumption, to Mrs. 
Ashton; 
3. That the property that was titled in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Ashton at the 
time or Mr. Ashton's death shall be included in Mr. Ashton's estate; 
4. That Mrs. Ashton and the Ashton children are responsible to pay their own 
fees and costs incurred in the litigation which shall not be an expense of Mr. Ashton's 
estate. 
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Mrs. Ashton's appeal is taken only from those portions of the judgment identified 
as numbers 3 and 4 above. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On February 22nd, 1989, one of the Ashton children, Kim Dale Ashton, filed his 
application for informal probate of Mr. Ashton's will and for informal appointment as 
personal representative, probate no. 893900184. Mrs. Ashton objected to Kim Ashton's 
application and further requested that the court make its determination that she was the 
sole heir to the estate of Mr. Ashton. Thereafter, the court converted the matter to 
formal probate and assigned Judge Uno to hear the case. Judge Uno appointed Mrs. 
Ashton personal representative and deferred the issue of determination of heirs for 
trial. In approximately June 1989, the Ashton children filed their complaint against Mrs. 
Ashton personally, and as personal representative, case no. 890904564, which was 
assigned to the Honorable Judge Rigtrup. The Ashton children sought, among other 
matters, a declaratory judgment that Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's wills were joint and 
reciprocal and a declaratory judgment as to Mrs. Ashton's life estate and the Ashton 
children's remainder interest 
Trial was held before Judge Uno in the probate case concerning the 
determination of heirs. On December 1st, 1989, Judge Uno entered his order 
declaring that Mrs. Ashton inherited a fee simple interest rather than a life estate. The 
Ashton children appealed. This Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
to determine Mr. Ashton's intent. In the matter of the Estate of Ashton. 804 P.2d 540 
5 
(UtahApp. 1990). 
Thereafter, the civil case, no. 890904564 was consolidated with the probate 
case, no. 893900184. Judge Uno retired and Judge Lewis replaced him. A trial was 
held before Judge Lewis, on all pending issues, November 1st, 1993. 
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, transcripts of the previous trial and 
hearings, and the depositions of Mrs. Ashton and Carolyn Driscoll2, were published 
and received as evidence at the trial. In addition evidence was taken from witnesses 
during the course of the trial. 
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Lewis rendered oral findings and ruled, 
among other matters, that Mrs. Ashton's interest in the estate was that of a life tenant, 
without any power of consumption, and that Mrs. Ashton and the Ashton children shall 
be responsible to pay their own litigation costs and expenses. Judge Lewis took under 
advisement the issue of whether joint tenancy and tenancy in common properties, titled 
in Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's joint names, should be part of the estate or whether Mr. 
Ashton intended to transfer a present interest to Mrs. Ashton. 
After receiving memoranda from the parties respective attorneys, Judge Lewis 
issued her Memorandum Decision on June 7th, 1994, ruling that Mr. Ashton did not 
intend to transfer a present interest to Mrs. Ashton at the time he created the various 
tenancies with her and that property held in the joint names of Mr. and Mrs. Ashton as 
2Carolyn Driscoll is the attorney who met with Mr. and Mrs. Ashton and prepared their 
March 12th, 1986 wills. 
6 
joint tenants or tenants in common must be included in Mr. Ashton's probate estate. 
The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were then 
entered July 11th, 1994. 
III. Statement of Facts. 
Rules 24(b) and 24(a)(7), Utah R. App. P., require that the Ashton children set 
forth a statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review.3 However, these 
rules further require that the statement of facts be supported by citations to the record 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of Rule 24. Mrs. Ashton has failed to provide a trial 
transcript or any other record of the facts in support of her appeal, other than the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. As a result, the trial court's findings of 
fact are taken as true and valid and the appellate court takes judicial notice of these 
facts. Low v. Bonnacci, 788 P.2d 512, 512; See also Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida, 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994).4 
3Rule 24(a)(7), Utah R. App. P., governing the form and content of the brief of 
appellant, provides as follows: " A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." 
Rule 24(b), Utah R. App. P., incorporates the foregoing as a requirement for the 
appellees brief also. 
4Mrs. Ashton's statement of facts, Brief of Appellant, pp. 5-6, are not supported 
by any reference to a record, or to the trial court's findings of fact. In fact, her 
statement of facts is not supported by the trial court's findings of fact and contains facts 
that the trial court either rejected, or were not presented at trial. For example, Mrs. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the trial court's findings of fact constitute the only 
valid facts relevant to the issues presented for review. The Ashton children therefore 
incorporate the findings of fact of the trial court herein by reference, as if originally set 
forth, . See Brief of Appellant, add., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err as a Matter of Law, in Determining Whether 
Mr. Ashton Intended to Give Mrs. Ashton a Present Interest in Property 
When he Titled Property in their Joint Names. 
A recital of joint tenancy on deeds, contracts, accounts, or other instruments is 
not an absolute. It gives rise to a presumption that the parties intended a valid joint 
tenancy with full rights of survivorship at the time the tenancy was created. The 
presumption can be overcome by establishing fraud, mistake, incapacity or other 
infirmity, undue influence, or by establishing through clear and convincing evidence 
that the parties intended otherwise. The dispositive issue in overcoming the 
presumption is intent, particularly the intent of the grantor, as shown by the totality of 
the facts and circumstances. The trial court correctly applied the foregoing principles, 
Ashton's statement includes facts to the effect that assets were acquired both prior to 
and after the execution of their wills, that they exercised joint dominion and control over 
the property titled in both their names, and that Mr. Ashton knew that upon his or Mrs. 
Ashton's death property held in joint tenancy would pass to the survivor outside of 
probate and not be subject to the directives of their wills. These facts contradict the 
specific findings of the trial court, are not part of the findings, and thus are not part of 
the record before this Court. Consequently, Mrs. Ashton's statement of facts should be 
entirely disregarded. 
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and did not err, in determining that the requisite intent to transfer a present interest to 
Mrs. Ashton was not present at the time the various tenancies in property were created. 
II. The Trial Court's Judgment Was Not Based Upon a Determination as to 
Whether Mrs. Ashton Contributed to Any Part of the Purchase Price of 
Joint Tenancy Property. Therefore, the Trial Court Did Not Commit Any 
Error. 
While Mrs Ashton argues that her rights of survivorship are not precluded by the 
fact that she may or may not have contributed to the purchase price of the joint tenancy 
properties, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and memorandum decision 
conclusively show that the trial court's judgment was not based, one way or the other, 
on this issue. Thus, the trial court did not commit any error on this point. 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Erroneously Place the Burden of Proof on Mrs. 
Ashton. Even If True, the Ashton Children Sustained Their Burden of 
Proof. 
A. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision Shows That The 
Trial Court Did Not Erroneously Place the Burden of Proof 
on Mrs. Ashton. 
The trial court's memorandum decision shows that the trial court decided that 
the determinative issue was intent, that the trial court must consider the totality of the 
facts and circumstances in deciding the issue of intent and that the presumption that 
attaches to joint tenancy must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The trial 
court did not decide that Mrs. Ashton had the burden of proving the validity of the joint 
tenancies by clear and convincing evidence. 
Also, in considering the context of the decision, the only logical reading 
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establishes that the trial court appropriately placed the burden of proof on the Ashton 
children, not Mrs. Ashton. 
B. Even If The Burden of Proof Was Erroneously Shifted To 
Mrs. Ashton, The Findings Of Fact Show That The Ashton 
Children Met The Appropriate Burden Of Proof Anyway. 
Even if the trial court erroneously applied the burden of proof to Mrs. Ashton, 
the trial court's decision must be affirmed if the evidence adduced at trial shows that 
the Ashton children sustained their burden when the appropriate standard is applied. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case show that the Ashton children 
sustained their burden of proof when the appropriate standard is applied. 
IV. The Trial Court Appropriately Determined the Issue of Intent at the Time 
the Various Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common Were Created. 
The trial court's memorandum decision and findings of fact contain specific 
references by the trial court showing that it was deciding the issue of intent when the 
various tenancies were created. This clearly and unambiguously shows that the trial 
court determined the issue of intent as of the time title was taken as joint tenants and 
not at the time Mr. Ashton executed his will. 
V. The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Decision Invalidating the Joint 
Tenancies and Tenancies in Common. 
Mrs. Ashton's claim that the trial court's findings do not rise to the level of clear 
and convincing evidence violates the standards of appellate review The appellate 
court has not had the opportunity to hear, consider, weigh and assess the evidence at 
trial and retrying the facts is not its function. So long as the findings of the trial court 
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adequately support its conclusions, its judgment must be affirmed. 
Mrs. Ashton grossly misrepresents the trial court's finding with respect to this 
issue and claims that the trial court's findings are based upon inferences. However, the 
actual findings, together with the memorandum decision, clearly demonstrate that the 
trial court applied the clear and convincing standard, considered the total facts and 
circumstances, and found that the evidence was clear and convincing. Thus the actual 
findings are not clearly erroneous. 
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Mrs. Ashton's Request for 
Litigation Expenses. 
Mrs. Ashton has not shown that any evidence was presented to the trial court 
with respect to the factors necessary in determining the reasonableness of her attorney 
fees requested. She only states that she moved at the close of trial to recover her 
litigation costs and attorney's fees against Mr. Ashton's estate. If she failed to present 
or proffer such evidence concerning her fees, then the trial court's judgment denying 
her request is proper. Thus, Mrs. Ashton has not shown that this issue was properly 
preserved for appeal or shown any record establishing that the denial was otherwise 
inappropriate. 
The trial court's denial was also appropriate because the litigation expenses 
involved the competing claims of heirs of the estate. Mrs. Ashton's capacity in the 
litigation was not that of a personal representative. If she was not prosecuting or 
defending the action pursuant to her fiduciary responsibilities as a personal 
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representative to use her authority for the best interests of the successors to the estate, 
namely, the Ashton children. The aim of Mrs. Ashton's claims in the litigation was the 
enhancement of her own prospects as an heir of the estate. Thus, the denial of 
attorney fees was proper because Mrs. Ashton was not functioning in her capacity as 
personal representative and, was not acting in good faith. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER MR. ASHTON INTENDED TO GIVE MRS. 
ASHTON A PRESENT INTEREST IN PROPERTY WHEN HE TITLED 
PROPERTY IN THEIR JOINT NAMES. 
Mrs. Ashton first argues that property titled in Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's names, as 
joint tenants with rights of survivorship, is not includable in Mr. Ashton's estate. Brief of 
Appellant, Point I, p. 8-9. She also argues that, by virtue of the law pertaining to joint 
tenancies, she takes the entire property free and clear from the claims of Mr. Ashton's 
children. ]d. However, the law pertaining to joint tenancies is not absolute. 
In the case Cullev v. Cullev. 404 P.2d 657, 658 (Utah 1965) the Utah Supreme 
Court held: "We recognize that from a recital of joint ownership with the right of 
survivorship there arises a presumption that such is the fact. But it is, of course, not 
absolute and invulnerable to attack. This is true even of deeds and other written 
instruments." In fact, the law is well established in this state that the presumption of 
joint ownership with the right of survivorship may be successfully attacked by 
establishing fraud, mistake, incapacity or other infirmity, undue influence, or by 
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establishing through clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended otherwise. 
For example, in the case West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058 (Utah 
App. 1993), a father and son purchased three pieces of real property. Each of the 
three were conveyed by warranty deed to the father and son as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common. After the father's death, the son 
conveyed the properties to himself and his father's widow as joint tenants. West One, 
the personal representative of the father's estate filed suit against the son and widow 
requesting that they be required to convey the properties to the estate. West one 
argued that the properties were actually owned by a partnership, consisting of the 
deceased father and the son, as equal partners, and that upon the father's death, the 
dissolution of the partnership necessarily occurred. Therefor each owned an undivided 
one-half interest in the properties, rather than vesting entirely in the son as the 
surviving joint tenant. 
The son and widow filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that 
because the deeds specified joint tenancy ownership, the properties passed to the son 
by operation of law upon his father's death. After a hearing, the court concluded that 
the three deeds were clear and unambiguous on their face and, therefore, that the 
father and the son held title to the properties as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship. West One appealed. 
On Appeal West One contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by 
precluding evidence that the parties intended the properties to be partnership property 
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and in concluding that the deeds established title by joint tenancy. West One argued 
that the deeds did not demonstrate the parties' true intent and that the joint tenancy 
designation on the deeds was a mistake. This Court reversed the trial court's summary 
judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Quoting 
from Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah 1984), this Court stated: "It is well 
settled that mistakes as to the legal effect of words used in a contract or deed, . . . are 
subject to reformation by the courts." West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d at 
1061. This Court further held: "The presumption that an unambiguous written 
document is accurate and binding requires a party to provide clear and convincing 
evidence of mistake to invoke the equitable remedy of reformation, (citations omitted)." 
]d. (citations omitted). This Court then reversed the summary judgment explaining: 
Therefore, in this case the trial court should have considered extrinsic 
evidence that may have demonstrated that the parties intended the 
subject properties to be held as partnership asserts, rather than as joint 
tenancies with rights of survivorship. We further conclude after examining 
the record before us, that there is an issue of material fact as to Jr.'s (the 
son's) and Sr.'s (the father's) intent regarding the properties' title." 
]d. (parenthetical designations added). 
In the case Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988), this Court 
also addressed the issue of intent with respect to deeds. Elsie Brinkerhoff was the 
owner of property in Kane County. In 1966, Elsie entered into an agreement to sell her 
property to two of her sons, Cloyd and Mark. The contract required specified payments 
and provided for an escrow account to hold the deeds and process the payments. In 
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June 1979, Elsie purportedly executed and recorded a joint tenancy deed granting title 
in the property to herself, Cloyd and Mark. In October, 1979, Cloyd died, vesting 
record title to the property in Elsie and Mark, each with an undivided one-half interest. 
Then in August, 1980, Elsie signed an affidavit severing the joint tenancy, and signed a 
deed from herself to five of her children, giving each child an undivided one-fifth 
interest of the one-half record interest Elsie maintained in the land. In 1982, Cloyd's 
personal representative and his widow, filed suit seeking to enforce the 1966 contract 
and to quiet title in the property. 
The trial court ruled that as of 1970, Elsie was not legally competent and that the 
1979 and 1980 deeds were invalid. Alternatively, the trial court found that the 1979 
joint tenancy deed and 1980 conveyance were not the result of Elsie's free will, but 
were brought about by the undue influence of family members. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 1979 joint tenancy 
deed and 1980 conveyance were not the result of Elsie's free will, holding as follows: 
When a deed is executed with no intent to transfer a present interest in 
property, it is invalid. Courts have consistently held that a conveyance is 
valid only upon delivery of a deed with the present intent to transfer. 
Intention is the essence of delivery and is of primary and controlling 
importance. The grantor's present intent must be to pass his or her title 
interest to the grantee and divest himself of the same; otherwise the 
purported deed is not valid or effective The facts clearly support 
the trial court's findings that Elsie did not have the necessary intent to 
transfer her property when she executed the 1979 and 1980 
conveyances. 
]d. at 100, (citations omitted) 
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In Tanaren v. Inaalls, 367 P.2d 179, 184 (Utah 1961), a case involving a bank 
account in joint tenancy, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We have discussed the foregoing cases to show that in most instances, 
where controversy has existed over the ownership of a bank account in 
joint tenancy, the court has considered the intent with which the account 
was created to be the basic and controlling fact. However, there is no 
necessity for us to quarrel with the interpretation that may be based on 
prior cases. Notwithstanding what may have been said therein, we are of 
the opinion that the rule which is sound in principal and practical in 
application is that applied in the cases of Neill v. Royce and Greener V. 
Greener, supra: that where there is a written agreement of joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship, there is a presumption of validity and it will be 
given effect unless it is successfully attacked for fraud, mistake, 
incapacity, or other infirmity, or unless it is shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parties intended otherwise; and further, that such rule is 
applicable whether the parties are living or where death has intervened. 
Nor would the fact that the original owner may have changed his mind 
after creation of the account alter the applicability of that rule. 
Since the decision in Tanaren v. Inqralls, ]d., the legislature, in 1975, enacted 
Section 75-3-104, Utah Code Anno., which governs the right of survivorship with 
respect to specific joint accounts. Subparagraph one of this section specifically states: 
"Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the 
surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear 
and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created." 
The above authority clearly sets forth the rule of law in this state with respect to 
joint tenant deeds and joint tenant accounts. There is a presumption of validity with 
respect to such deeds and accounts that may be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence of a different intention, mistake, fraud, incapacity or other infirmity, or undue 
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influence. If the presumption is rebutted, then the court may make such orders as are 
necessary in equity to carry out the actual intentions. In any event, the above authority 
makes absolutely clear that the intent of the parties, particularly the grantor, is the 
dispositive issue and that the trial court must consider the totality of the facts and 
circumstances in making its determination as to intent. 
The trial court in this case correctly applied the foregoing principles. Mr. 
Ashton's four children alleged that Mr. Ashton did not intend to transfer a present 
interest in his property to Mrs. Ashton at the time he placed title to his property in joint 
tenancy or as tenants in common with her. The children further alleged that Mr. Ashton 
mistakenly believed that, by doing so, he would avoid probate, but that his children 
would nevertheless benefit from his property after Mrs. Ashton's death in accordance 
with the percentage interest set forth in his estate plan, (93% of Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's 
total combined estate). Consequently Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's true intent was to avoid 
probate, and not to transfer a present interest in Mr. Ashton's property to Mrs. Ashton. 
This issue was fully tried by the trial court. As shown in the trial court's 
memorandum decision and the findings of fact and conclusions of law, Brief of 
Appellant, add., the trial court properly determined that the dispositive issue was Mr. 
Ashton's intent in creating the various joint tenancies and that the trial court must look 
to the totality of the facts and circumstances in making that determination. Inasmuch as 
the trial court properly applied the correct rule of law, its decision must be affirmed. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS NOT BASED UPON A 
DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER MRS. ASHTON CONTRIBUTED 
TO ANY PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF JOINT TENANCY 
PROPERTY. THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ANY ERROR 
Mrs. Ashton also argues that her rights of survivorship are not precluded by the 
fact that she may or may not have contributed to the purchase price of the joint tenancy 
properties. Brief of Appellant, Point I (A), pp. 9-10. However, the trial court's judgment 
was not based, one way or the other, on this issue. Thus, the trial court did not commit 
any error on this point. 
After making a determination that the question of intent was the dispositive issue 
and that a clear and convincing standard must be applied, the trial court, in its 
memorandum decision, then outlined the facts on which it relied in ruling that Mr. 
Ashton did not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present interest in his property at the time 
the tenancies were created. See Brief of Appellant, add., Memorandum Decision.. The 
fact that Mrs. Ashton may or may not have contributed to the purchase price is not 
mentioned. 
Likewise, the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth the facts found by 
the trial court in accordance with Rule 52, Utah R.Civ. P. See Brief of Appellant, add., 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Whether Mrs. Ashton may or may not have 
contributed to the purchase price is not a fact found by the trial court. The trial court 
simply did not address this specific issue or make any finding thereon. Consequently, 
the trial court did not commit any error in this regard. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY PLACE THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF ON MRS. ASHTON. EVEN IF TRUE, THE ASHTON 
CHILDREN SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Mrs Ashton alleges that the trial court committed error by erroneously placing 
the burden of proof on her instead of the Ashton children. Brief of Appellant, Point III 
(A), pp. 14 -16. The trial court's memorandum decision does not support this 
contention. Moreover, as shown hereafter, even if the burden of proof was erronously 
shifted to Mrs. Ashton, the findings of facts show that Ashton children met the 
appropriate burden of proof anyway. 
A. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision Shows That 
The Trial Court Did Not Erroneously Place the Burden of 
Proof on Mrs. Ashton. 
Mrs. Ashton's assertion of error is that "the trial court erroneously relied on the 
Idaho Supreme Court case of Parker v. Kokot, 793 P.2d 195 (Idaho 1990) and placed 
the burden of proving the validity of the various joint tenancies on Mrs. Ashton instead 
of placing the burden of proof on appellees." Brief of Appellant, Point I (A), p. 14. The 
memorandum decision shows, however, that the trial court simply relied on this case to 
determine the dispositive issue of intent and to determine the evidence required to 
rebut the presumption of validity that attaches to joint tenancies. 
The trial court cited two cases in its memorandum decision; Edstrom v. Kuder. 
351 A.2d 506 (D.C. 1976), and the Parker case, 793 P.2d 195. After reviewing the 
facts in the Edstrom case, the Court concluded that, with respect to the issue of 
19 
whether joint tenancies or tenancies in common are created for mere business or 
personal convenience, M(t)he dispositive issue is the decedent's intent." Brief of 
Appellant, add., Memorandum Decision, p. 2. The trial court then went on to review the 
facts in the Parker case. Of particular significance is the trial court's emphasis on 
certain language quoted from the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling. This emphasis was 
noted by the trial court by underlining specific language within the quote itself. See, id., 
at p.3. This language consists of the following: 
1. " . . . merely placing names of other persons on a joint account does not 
preclude a showing that the account was set up for business or personal convenience 
reasons. . ."; 
2. "Whether a bank account is held in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship 
depends on the intention of the parties, determined in the light of all the circumstances; 
3.". . . clear and convincing evidence. . . " 
The trial concluded its review of the above cases by stating: "In applying the above 
authority to this case, it is necessary to consider the totality of facts and circumstances 
of this case in accordance with the ruling in Parker, infra, and a clear and convincing 
standard must be applied. ]d., at p. 4. 
This shows that the trial court relied on the Edstrom and Parker cases as 
authority only in deciding that the determinative issue was intent, that the trial court 
must consider the totality of the facts and circumstances in deciding the issue of intent, 
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and the burden of proof was by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court did not 
state that Mrs. Ashton had the burden of proving the validity of the joint tenancies by 
clear and convincing evidence. Mrs. Ashton's argument in this regard is simply not 
logical or consistent with the context of the trial Court's memorandum decision. 
In considering the context of the memorandum decision, it is clear that the trial 
court decided that the clear and convincing standard must be applied to the issue of 
the decedent's intent at the time he created the various joint tenancies with Mrs. 
Ashton. After making this decision, the trial court then went on and set forth the facts 
which it found met this burden, ultimately concluding, in favor of the Ashton children, 
that Mr. Ashton did not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present interest or ownership in his 
property and that the joint tenancies were created for convenience. These facts pertain 
to the Ashton children's position that the tenancies were not valid, not Mrs. Ashton's 
claim. Consequently, it is clear from the memorandum decision that the trial court did 
not erroneously place the burden upon Mrs. Ashton to prove the validity of the various 
joint tenancies by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, the memorandum decision, 
when considered in its totality, logically shows that the burden of proof was placed 
upon the Ashton Children. 
B. Even If the Burden of Proof Was Erroneously Shifted to 
Mrs. Ashton, the Findings of Fact Show that the Ashton 
Children Met the Appropriate Burden of Proof Anyway. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the standard for appellate review when 
the allegation of error is that the burden of proof was erroneously placed upon the 
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wrong party. In Pilcher v. Pilcher, 197 P.2d 143 (Utah 1948), the appellant claimed that 
the burden of proof was erroneously placed upon her. However, the respondent 
contended that even if this was true, the respondent sustained the burden of proof 
anyway. The Utah Supreme Court held: "If this is so, then the error of the lower court 
in misconceiving the burden of proof is not prejudicial. We look then to the evidence 
adduced to determine whether the respondent has in fact sustained the burden which 
properly should have been hers." ]d. at 197. This standard was affirmed in City 
Electric v. Industrial Indemnity Corp., 683 P.2d 1053, 1059-1060 (Utah 1984) where the 
Court held: 
Under familiar rules of appellate procedure, we are constrained to review 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the trial court's application of an erroneous 
burden, we will affirm its decision if by applying the appropriate burden we 
arrive at the same result. 
Consequently, even if the trial court erroneously applied the burden of proof on Mrs. 
Ashton, the trial court's decision must be affirmed if the evidence adduced at trial 
shows that the Ashton children sustained their burden when the appropriate standard is 
applied. However, Mrs. Ashton failed to file a trial transcript. Under these 
circumstances the appellate court takes judicial notice of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law reached by the trial court. They are taken as true. Low v. Bonnacci. 
788 p.2d 512, 512 (Utah 1990). 
In this case, the findings of fact and conclusions of law show that the Ashton 
children sustained their burden of proof when the appropriate standard is applied. 
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Each of the findings of fact establishes clearly and convincingly that Mr. Ashton did not 
intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present interest in his property when he created the 
various joint tenancies and tenancies in common with her. Of particular significance 
are the Court's following findings: 
1. That both Mr. and Mrs. Ashton were concerned about a fair distribution of 
their combined total estate to their respective children; Brief of Appellant, add., 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, H 6; 
2. That Mrs. Ashton raised her concern with Mr. Ashton about providing for her 
children's inheritance with respect to the assets she brought into the marriage; id., at U 
7; 
3. That Mr. Ashton did not want to disinherit his children and wanted to take 
care of his children from his estate; id., at H 8; 
4. That Mr. Ashton prepared two financial work sheets, one conservative and 
one optimistic, to determine a percentage division of the combined total estate between 
Mr. Ashton's children and Mrs. Ashton's children, which included property that was 
transferred into joint tenancy and tenancy in common with Mrs. Ashton; id., at U 9; 
5. That Mr. Ashton was clearly concerned about the property that would 
constitute the remainder interest in his children; id., at fl 10; 
6. That while Mrs. Ashton did not agree with the percentages calculated by Mr. 
Ashton to divide their combined total estate between their respective children, including 
the property that was transferred into joint tenancy and tenancy in common with Mrs. 
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Ashton, she was aware of the percentage division and executed identical wills with Mr. 
Ashton providing for a division of their combined total estate for the benefit of their 
respective children based upon the percentages that Mr. Ashton derived, including the 
property that was transferred into joint tenancy and tenancy in common with Mrs. 
Ashton; | d , atffH 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 & 31. 
7. That Mrs. Ashton's understanding of the final will is that when she dies his 
children will receive a portion of the estate and that when they are both dead, the step 
children and Mr. Ashton's children were to receive their inheritance; Id., at f^ 26; 
8. That based upon the Carolyn Driscoll's discussions with Mr. Ashton, she 
understood that Mr. Ashton intended that upon his death, assets attributable to him, 
would pass to his children; ]d., at 1} 28; 
9. That after executing identical wills with Mr. Ashton, Mrs. Ashton was still 
concerned about her children receiving their fair share upon Mr. Ashton's death; ]d., at 
1133; 
10. That after further discussion between Mr. and Mrs. Ashton, their original 
identical wills were amended to change the percentages of their combined estates to 
be divided between their respective children over time; ]d., at H 34; 
11. That Mr. Ashton clearly articulated his concern for his children and his intent 
to ultimately divide his and Mrs. Ashton's total estate between their respective children; 
id., at H 35; 
12. That Mr. Ashton's efforts to itemize his and Mrs. Ashton's combined total 
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estate, including properties that were transferred into joint tenancies and tenancies in 
common with Mrs. Ashton, indicates Mr. Ashton's intent to provide Mrs. Ashton with 
only a life estate; Id., at J^ 36; 
13. That the vast majority of Mr. Ashton's property was transferred into joint 
tenancies and tenancies in common with Mrs. Ashton. However, Mr. Ashton expressed 
a desire to preserve property for his children's benefit and there is nothing to suggest 
that he had any intent to disinherit them, which is inconsistent with giving Mrs. Ashton a 
present ownership in any property that was transferred to Mrs. Ashton as a joint tenant 
or tenant in common; id., at fflf 37 - 38; 
14. That the totality of the facts and circumstances establish that both Mr. and 
Mrs. Ashton intended to provide each other with a simple life estate without any power 
of consumption subject to the estate being preserved for the benefit of each other's 
children in the percentage amount set forth in the addendum to their identical wills; id., 
atH39; 
15. That, in addition to providing Mrs. Ashton with a life estate, Mr. Ashton 
provided additional substantial non-probate benefits for Mrs. Ashton by naming her as 
the beneficiary thereto; id., at [^ 40; 
16. That the total facts and circumstances further establish that Mr. Ashton did 
not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present interest or ownership in his property and that 
the joint tenancies and tenancies in common were created for convenience; Id., at ^ 
41. 
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After applying the appropriate burden of proof on Mr. Ashton's children, the 
foregoing findings of fact, together with the trial court's memorandum decision, 
demonstrate that Mr. Ashton's children rebutted the presumption that attaches to the 
validity of joint tenancies by showing a contrary intent, clearly and convincingly.5 
Consequently, even if the trial court erred in shifting the burden of proof to Mrs. Ashton, 
the findings of fact show that Mr. Ashton's children met their burden of proof by the 
evidence adduced at trial, even when the appropriate burden is applied to them. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED THE ISSUE OF 
INTENT AT THE TIME THE VARIOUS JOINT TENANCIES AND 
TENANCIES IN COMMON WERE CREATED. 
Mrs. Ashton argues that the trial court erred by failing to ascertain the intent of 
the parties as of the time title was taken as joint tenants. Brief of Appellant, Point III 
(B), p. 16. She further asserts that the trial court's factual findings relate to Mr. 
Ashton's intent as of the time he executed his will and that the trial court made no 
factual finding that addressed his intentions at the time he took title in joint tenancy with 
Mrs. Ashton. ]d., at 17. The trial court was obligated to determine intent as of the time 
title was taken as joint tenants. However, the trial court's memorandum decision and 
findings of fact clearly and unambiguously show that the trial court did determine intent 
5When considering the findings of the trial court, it is obvious that the evidence supporting 
the findings was adduced by the Ashton children, not Mrs. Ashton, inasmuch as the evidence and 
findings are contrary to the arguments of Mrs. Ashton at trial. This further demonstrates that the 
Ashton children met their burden of proof. 
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as of the time title was taken as joint tenants. 
In the opening paragraphs to the trial court's memorandum decision, the trial 
court stated: 
This ruling addresses the issue of whether the decedent (Mr. Ashton) 
intended to transfer a valid present interest and/or right of survivorship, in 
his property to the defendant, Mrs. Ruth Ashton, when he created 
various joint tenancies and tenancies in common before his death, or 
whether the property is part of the decedent's estate and therefore subject 
to probate. 
Brief of Appellant, add., Memorandum Decision, p.1. (emphasis added). 
In response to Mrs. Ashton's argument that the joint property should not be 
included in the probate estate because it was under the direction and control of both 
parties before the will was created, the trial court stated: "This assertion does not 
address the dispositive issue of Mr. Ashton's intent in creating the various joint 
tenancies." jd., at p. 7. 
The trial court further stated in conclusion: 
This Court therefore finds, based on the totality of facts and 
circumstances of this case alluded to herein, that Mr. Ashton did not 
intend to give the Defendant a present interest or ownership in his 
property, that the joint tenancies were created for convenience, and 
that said property must be included in the decedent's estate. 
jd., (emphasis added). 
These statements show that the trial court properly focused on intent at the time 
of creation of the various tenancies, contrary to Mrs. Ashton's assertion that trial court's 
findings only address Mr. Ashton's intent at the time he executed his will. 
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The findings of fact also demonstrate that the trial properly focused on intent at 
the time of creation of the various tenancies. Finding of Fact number 38 states: 
Plaintiffs trial exhibit #17, a summary of the Decedent's property, shows 
that the vast majority of the Decedent's property was transferred into joint 
tenancies or tenancies in common with the Defendant. The Decedent 
expressed a desire to preserve property for his children's benefit. This is 
inconsistent with giving the Defendant a present ownership interest 
in any property that was transferred from the Decedent to her as a 
joint tenant or as a tenant in common. 
Brief of Appellant, add., Findings of Facts, p. 8. (emphasis added). 
Finding of fact number 41 further states: 
The total facts and circumstances further establish that the Decedent 
did not intend to give the Defendant a present interest or ownership 
in his property, that the joint tenancies and tenancies in common 
were created for convenience, and that any such property held as joint 
tenants or as tenants in common with the Defendant must be included in 
the Decedent's estate. 
]d., (emphasis added). 
The findings of fact and memorandum decision, taken together, also show that 
the trial court analyzed the total facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, 
the parties' joint estate plan which provided a division of the entire combined estate 
between their respective children including the property that was transferred into joint 
tenancies and tenancies in common, Mrs. Ashton's understanding that when she and 
Mrs. Ashton were both dead their respective children were to receive their inheritance 
of the total combined estate in accordance with the percentage division set forth in the 
identical wills, Mr. Ashton's intent to create a life estate in Mrs. Ashton with a remainder 
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interest in his children, Mr. Ashton's concern with preserving his estate for his 
children's inheritance, the language of Mr. Ashton's will and the dispositive provisions 
contained therein, Mr. Ashton's desire to preserve his property for his children's benefit, 
and Mr. Ashton's method of otherwise providing for Mrs. Ashton by naming her as the 
beneficiary on non-probate benefits in excess of $122,000. See Brief of Appellant, 
Add., Findings of Fact, Memorandum Decision. All of the foregoing show the trial 
court's proper analysis of intent at the time the various tenancies were created by 
taking into consideration the total facts and circumstances. 
The trial court clearly addressed the issue of intent at the time the various joint 
tenancies and tenancies in common were created by analyzing the total facts and 
circumstances. Mrs. Ashton's argument that the trial court's findings relate only to Mr. 
Ashton's intent at the time he executed his will is not supported by either the 
memorandum decision or the findings of fact. In addition, her argument that the trial 
court made no findings concerning the intent at the time the tenancies were created is 
contrary to the clear language contained in the memorandum decision and the findings 
of fact. Consequently the trial court did not err in deciding intent. 
V. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
INVALIDATING THE JOINT TENANCIES AND TENANCIES IN 
COMMON. 
Mrs. Ashton further argues that the evidence relied upon by the trial court does 
not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. Brief of Appellant, p. 18-20. In 
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the case In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon. 869 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 
1994)(citations omitted), this Court held as follows: 
The factual issue of the decedent's intent is one we review with deference 
to the trial court's findings, if adequate, and we reverse only upon a 
finding of clear error. In order to show clear error, the appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly 
erroneous. 
As stated previously, Mrs. Ashton failed to file a trial transcript. Under these 
circumstances the appellate court takes judicial notice of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law reached by the trial court. Low v. Bonnacci. 788 p.2d 512, 512. In 
fact, Mrs. Ashton does not question the veracity of the factual findings but argues the 
findings do not "constitute clear and convincing evidence of an intention, on Mr. 
Ashton's part, not to create valid joint tenancies." Brief of Appellant, Point III (C), p. 19. 
In the case Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 
1994)(citations omitted) this Court explained: 
The deference we afford to trial courts' findings is based on and fosters 
the principle that traditional fact finders, whether judges or juries, are 
better equipped to consider, weigh, and assess the evidence that litigants 
bring before the courts. Efficient resolution of disputes demands that, 
unless the facts found by the trial court are clearly erroneous, they will be 
upheld on appeal. In short, we do not sit to retry the facts. Successful 
challenges to findings of fact thus must demonstrate to appellate courts 
first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence and second why 
such findings contradict the weight of the evidence. These 
demonstrations in appellants' briefs not only avoid retrying the facts but 
also assist us in our decision-making and opinion-writing, thus increasing 
our efficiency. 
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The trial court clearly considered, weighed and assessed the evidence at trial. 
The trial court was obviously applying a standard of clear and convincing evidence at 
the time it made its determination as to intent. See Point III (A) hereinabove. The trial 
court also clearly considered the total facts and circumstances in deciding intent when 
the various tenancies were created. See Point III (B) above. The trial court did find 
clear and convincing evidence of an intention on Mr. Ashton's part not to create valid 
tenancies with Mrs. Ashton and the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Mrs. Ashton claims that the findings do not rise to the level of clear and 
convincing evidence. This claim violates the standards of appellate review. See 
Oneida/SLIC, ]d., This Court has not had the opportunity to hear, consider, weigh and 
assess the evidence at trial and this Court is not in a position to retry the facts. The 
trial court clearly found clear and convincing evidence of intent sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of validity that attaches to joint tenancies. Insofar as the findings are 
adequate to support the trial court's conclusion, its judgment must be affirmed. 
Mrs. Ashton inappropriately bolsters her claim that the findings do not rise to the 
level of clear and convincing evidence by grossly misrepresenting the trial court's 
findings. She claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court consists solely of 
findings that 1) Mr. Ashton loved his children; 2) Mr. Ashton did not want to disinherit 
his children at the time he executed his will; 3) Mr. Ashton wanted to provide for his 
children through his will; 4) Mrs. Ashton was a beneficiary of a life insurance policy; 5) 
Mr. Ashton spent considerable time and energy into developing a plan for distributing 
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his property upon his death; and, 6) when developing this plan, he considered the 
entire scope and nature of his holdings. She contends that the trial court's judgment 
was based on inference, unsupported by evidence. 
The trial court's findings of fact on this issue do not consist solely of the 
foregoing. Notably absent from Mrs. Ashton's characterization of the trial court's 
findings are those findings that articulate 1) the joint concern of both Mr. and Mrs. 
Ashton to fairly distribute their combined total estate to their respective children, Brief 
of Appellant, Add. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, U 6; 2) Mrs. Ashton's 
concern with Mr. Ashton about providing for her children's inheritance from the assets 
she brought into the marriage; id., at ^| 7; 3) Mr. Ashton's preparation of two work 
sheets containing all of the assets of Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's combined estate, including 
the property that was transferred into joint tenancy and tenancy in common before and 
after execution of their wills which was used to determine a percentage division 
between their respective children of the entire combined estate, including the joint 
tenancy and tenancy in common property, jd., at fl 9; 4) Mr. Ashton's clear concern 
about the property that would constitute the remainder interest in his children, ]d., at U 
10; 5) the fact that the percentages were to divide the entire combined estate between 
their respective children after Mr. and Mrs. Ashton were both dead, jd., at ^ 12; 6) the 
fact that Mrs. Ashton was aware of the percentage division and signed identical wills 
with Mr. Ashton based upon the foregoing, which wills were executed in connection 
with one another so that Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's respective children would get their 
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proportionate share of the total combined estate, id., at fflj 14-21, 29-31; 7) Mrs. 
Ashton's understanding of the final will that when both she and Mr. Ashton are dead, 
the step children and children were to receive their inheritance, id., at U 26; 8) Mr. 
Ashton's statement to Mrs. Ashton that she would enjoy what he had as long as she live 
and that when she dies, she wouldn't, and the fact that Mr. Ashton never stated that he 
wanted Mrs. Ashton to have his entire estate, that he simply wanted her to be taken 
care of id., at fl 24 - 25; 9) Carolyn Driscoll's understanding from Mr. Ashton that he 
intended that upon his death, assets attributable to him would pass to his children, Id., 
at 1| 28; 10) Mr. Ashton's clear articulation of his concern for his children and his intent 
to ultimately divide his and Mrs. Ashton's total estate between their respective children, 
Jd., at 1| 35; 11) Mr. Ashton's intent to provide Mrs. Ashton with a life estate without any 
power of consumption with a remainder interest in his children, id., at U 36; 12) the vast 
majority of Mr. Ashton's property being transferred into joint tenancies or tenancies in 
common with Mrs. Ashton which is inconsistent with Mr. Ashton's express desire to 
preserve his property for his children's benefit, id., at U 38; 13) the totality of the facts 
and circumstances establishing that Mr. and Mrs. Ashton's intent was to provide each 
other with a simple life estate without any power of consumption, subject to their estate 
being preserved for the benefit of each other's children in accordance with the 
percentages set forth in the wills, id., at fl 39; 14) Mr. Ashton's contemplation of 
providing for Mrs. Ashton by naming her as beneficiary to over $122,000 in non-probate 
interests consisting of life insurance, a savings and investment plan and an IRA, id., at 
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TI40; and, 15) the total facts and circumstances establishing Mr. Ashton's intent not to 
give Mrs. Ashton a present interest or ownership in his property and that the joint 
tenancies and tenancies in common were created for convenience, Id., at TJ 41. The 
above list is not meant to be complete. However these findings, together with the 
memorandum decision clearly demonstrate that the trial court applied the clear and 
convincing standard in its analysis of the issue of intent pertaining to the creation of 
the various tenancies, considered the total facts and circumstances, and found that the 
evidence was clear and convincing. Clearly the trial court's judgment was not based 
solely on the six findings itemized by Mrs. Ashton. The actual findings are not clearly 
erroneous, they rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court 
clearly considered the relevant factors in determining intent. Its judgment should be 
affirmed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MRS. ASHTON'S 
REQUEST FOR LITIGATION EXPENSES. 
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, Mrs. Ashton's attorney requested that 
Mr. Ashton's estate be ordered to pay Mrs. Ashton's litigation costs and attorney's fees. 
The trial Court denied this request. The trial court's judgment should be sustained 
because Mrs. Ashton has failed to marshall any evidence, or show from the record, that 
the Court's judgment was in error or that Mrs. Ashton preserved this issue at trial. 
Utah Code Anno. §75-3-719 (1953), as amended, provides: "If any personal 
representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes 
34 
any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from 
the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred." In Dixie State Bank v.Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court delineated the factors necessary for a determination of an award of 
attorney fees holding that proof of these factors is necessary in order to establish the 
reasonableness of any fees awarded.. Those factors are set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant at page 22. 
In this case, Mrs. Ashton has not shown that any evidence was presented to the 
trial court with respect to the factors necessary in determining the reasonableness of 
her attorney fees. She only states that she moved to recover her litigation costs and 
attorney's fees against Mr. Ashton's estate at the close of trial. If she failed to present 
or proffer such evidence, then the trial court's judgment denying her request is proper. 
In the Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida case, 872 P.2d 1051 1053-54, this Court stated: 
Additionally, the deference we afford to trial courts' factual findings is 
based on and fosters the principle that appellants rather than appellees 
bear the greater burden on appeal. When appellants do not marshal the 
evidence in support of disputed findings, they place appellees or 
respondents in a precarious position. Prudent appellees likely will not rely 
solely on an assertion that the appellant has failed to marshal the 
evidence; rather, appellees are compelled to perform the marshaling 
process to protect their position. In short, appellees are constrained to do 
the appellant's work, usually at considerable time and expense. When 
appellants challenge findings of fact, fairness requires that they bear the 
costs of demonstrating how the trial court found those facts from the 
evidence and why those findings contradict the weight of the evidence. 
The marshaling requirement, therefore, enhances both fairness and 
efficiency as appellate courts hear appeals of trial court rulings. 
35 
The same principles should apply to Mrs. Ashton's claim that the trial court erred 
in denying her request for payment of her litigation expenses from Mr. Ashton's estate. 
Mrs. Ashton should have the burden on appeal to show that she presented or proffered 
evidence at trial, or pursuant to a post-trial motion, sufficient to establishing the factors 
set forth in the Dixie v. Bracken case. Mrs. Ashton has failed to do so. She simply has 
not shown that this issue was preserved for appeal before the trial court. 
Consequently she has not shown that the trial court's order denying her request for 
payment of attorney fees was in error. 
Moreover, the trial court's denial was appropriate because the litigation 
expenses involved the competing claims of heirs of the estate. Mrs. Ashton's capacity 
in the litigation was not that of a personal representative. Section 75-3-703, Utah Code 
Anno., (1953), as amended sets forth the general duties of a personal representative. 
This statute states at subparagraph (1), in pertinent part: 
A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard of 
care applicable to trustees as described by Section 75-7-302. A personal 
representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the 
decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will 
and this code and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the 
best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him 
by this code, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to 
which he is party for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
As set forth therein, a personal representative is not only a fiduciary, but is obligated to 
use her authority for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
The litigation in this case involved the competing claims of successors to the 
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estate. Mrs. Ashton was claiming that she was the sole heir of the estate, not a life 
tenant, and that the estate did not include the property that Mr. Ashton transferred to 
her as joint tenants or tenants in common. On the other hand, the Ashton children were 
claiming that Mrs. Ashton was not the sole heir of the estate, rather she was a life 
tenant, and that the estate should include Mr. Ashton's property that was transferred 
into various tenancies with Mrs. Ashton. Mrs. Ashton, by virtue of her claims, was not 
using her authority in this litigation for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
Consequently, it cannot be said that her true capacity through the litigation was that of 
a personal representative. She claimed to be an heir, competing against the claims of 
the Ashton children. 
Section 75-3-719 applies to a personal representative who prosecutes or 
defends actions in good faith. This Section must be construed together with Section 
75-3-703. When construed together, it is clear that a personal representative must be 
acting within her statutory authority with respect to the action she is prosecuting or 
defending. Mrs. Ashton was not acting within her statutory authority pertaining to a 
personal representative in this litigation. She was not using her authority in this 
litigation for the best interest of the successors to the estate. Again, she was acting to 
establish her sole claim as heir and, to defeat the other successors' claims. 
Consequently, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
The editorial board comment to Section 75-3-719 states: "Litigation prosecuted 
by a personal representative for the primary purpose of enhancing his prospects for 
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compensation would not be in good faith." While this comment appears to pertain to 
individuals' competing claims to letters of administration, the principle expressed 
therein applies to Mrs. Ashton's claim for attorney fees in this case as well. Mrs. 
Ashton's claims in the litigation were for the self serving purpose of establishing herself 
as the sole heir, thereby enhancing her own prospect of inheritance as a successor to 
the estate.. This is akin to the purpose of enhancing a personal representative's 
prospects for compensation, which would not be in good faith. Inasmuch as the aim of 
Mrs. Ashton's claims in the litigation was the enhancement of her own prospects as an 
heir of the estate, her attorney's fees and expenses in this litigation were not incurred in 
good faith and the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ashton children respectfully pray that the trial court's judgment be affirmed, 
and that they be awarded their costs and fees on appeal as may be appropriate in the 
premises. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 1995 
Lr4.tfL^/*<{ for*-* 
Jphn K. Rice 
^Attorney for Respondents 
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